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Case Comment:
Smyth v. Szep
Unsettling Settlements:
Of Unconscionability and
Other Things
by David Vaver
The recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Smyth v. Szep' once
again canvasses the validity of releases signed by injured victims in favour of insurance
companies and once again plunges into the murky waters of contractual unconscionability. Both issues have become more or less permanent squatters on judicial calendars
throughout North America, and it seems worthwhile to consider why this is so and
whether something can be done to reduce their tenure at least in Canada.
1. The facts
Ten days before Christmas day in 1986, Martina Smyth, a 19-year old university
student working part-time at McDonalds to make ends meet, got hurt in a car accident
and was prescribed physiotherapy for persistent shoulder and lower back pains. ICBC
was notified of the accident and an adjuster - let's call him, generically, Settler - was
allocated the file a few months later. Settler had begun his adjusting career when Smyth
was still in diapers: 17 years altogether, 15 with ICBC, almost ever since ICBC got started.
Contacting Smyth in April 1987, Settler learned Smyth was still being treated and
that she was soon off to Europe for a few months. When Smyth returned "broke", Settler
asked her to come round to the claims centre, which she did on September 1, 1987.
He quickly got to the point. He had a report from her family doctor dated April 1987,
saying her condition at the end of February 1987, the last time the doctor had seen
her, was all right: no permanent or partial disability expected. But Settler knew Smyth
had been getting physiotherapy for her pains since February 1987 in Canada and learned
she had had some in England too, for which she had receipts.
No-one will really know what went on in that September 1, 1987, meeting. The participants gave the usual conflicting versions. Smyth didn't seem clear exactly why she
was there but Settler was obviously out to close his file. He told her she had two years
to start a legal action and that she could retain a lawyer. He said ICBC would pay her
$2,500 to settle her claim for non-pecuniary damages and $131 for her special damages
($81 lost wages at McDonalds and $50 for physiotherapy in England). The upshot was
that Smyth signed a release for $2,631, the usual comprehensive document clearing
both the negligence claim against the other driver (Szep) and also ICBC's no-fault liability
for Smyth's future treatment and rehabilitation costs and loss of income flowing from
the accident.
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. The author wishes to thank his colleagues
Reuben Hasson and Harry Glasbeek for reading a draft of this paper and commenting usefully on it.
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When Smyth's father found out that day what had happened, he called Settler and
gave him a piece of his mind. Two days later, on September 3, 1987, Smyth herself
came round to Settler with a letter revoking her acceptance of the offer of release, saying she had acted involuntarily and that the extent of her injuries was yet unresolved.
ICBC said the release was binding and later sent her a cheque for $2,631, which Smyth
returned. When Smyth later sued to recover damages for her injuries, ICBC sought
to have judgment entered for Smyth for only $2,631, the amount stated in the release.
2. In the courts
The trial judge dismissed ICBC's application, finding the release should be rescinded
as an unconscionable bargain. On January 21, 1992, a majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed ICBC's appeal. Taylor J.A., with whom Wood J.A. concurred, agreed
with the trial judge that the release was unconscionable and should not be enforced.
Gibbs J.A. dissented. He would have entered judgment for Smyth for $2,631 because
she knew what she was doing, Settler had not dominated her will, and there was no
proof the sum agreed on was "substantially unfair."2 In the result, Smyth could now
pursue her claim for compensation, untrammelled by the release she had signed.
I think the result reached by the majority is correct. Gibbs J.A. treated the case as
if it were a simple free market transaction between a willing seller and buyer. It was
nothing of the sort. Smyth could not shop around for people to pay her compensation
for her injuries. There was only one supplier of compensation, the insurer ICBC, and
by law it had to supply her with her due. This is the practical case whenever an insured
claims from her insurer. ICBC happens to enjoy in British Columbia a legal monopoly
in the provision of motor vehicle accident compensation; but virtually every insurer is,
vis-A-vis its insured, a spot monopolist, because the insurer is practically the insured's
only recourse for compensation. True, the insurer's power can be modified or weakened
by the culture prevailing within the insurer's organization, by legal or extra-legal sanctions, or by any combination of these. Weak legal sanctions obviously encourage insurers to delay settlement or exact a price for early settlement.
I disagree with a legal policy that gives monopolies incentives to provide a lower standard of essential service - compensation for personal injury - than that prescribed
by the law establishing the monopoly. Why should the law encourage Smyth in effect
to pay a further large premium, namely the foregone difference between her due and
what ICBC got her to agree to, as the price of getting the latter sum? A release of liability for personal injuries is not just a private matter that private parties should be entitled
to order as they like. It is a contract in which the public is very much interested. A funded insurance scheme is supposed to be supported by the premiums allocated to it and
should not, except by conscious public decision, be supported indirectly by taxation
or premiums allocated to other community resources such as medical services or the
social welfare system. Undercompensation causes unjustifiable distortions in the allocation and incidence of taxation and premiums.
Unconscionability was one course open to the majority to achieve the result it did
and will likely continue to be so as long as legislatures don't intervene. Were the doctrine a mere staging-post to a flat rule invalidating all releases where the fallout of an
accident is inaccurately predicted, it might be unobjectionable. But, alas, judges don't
treat unconscionability that way. They claim to examine the minutiae of every case,
thinking individualized justice is best. Maybe it is, if you are a lawyer or a judge, but
not always if you are a litigant.
I am no fan of unconscionability.' Whether created by judges (as in Canada) or by
legislation,' it does little more than give judges a platform from which they give their
varying pronouncements on how far ordinary people should or should not be disciplined
for behaving like ordinary people when dealing with private and public sector bureau-
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cracies. This process yields few stable or durable principles and is an unpredictable and
expensive response to the problem of releases.
I should much prefer that either courts hold or legislatures provide for these releases
to be void on grounds of public policy.' Any payment would then be interim. Until the
action is time-barred, victims should be free to claim further against the insurer if they
find they have injuries they didn't think they had when the release was signed. This
won't happen often, only in pathological cases: adjusted claims will still remain the norm.
However, in the small minority of cases where injuries prove more severe, insurers should
get on with the job entrusted to them, paying compensation, not litigating prematurely
signed releases.
Before elaborating some of these points, I shall first look at some features of unconscionability as applied by the judges in Smyth v. Szep.
3. Unconscionability: actionable unfairness in action
(a) Who rescinds: people or judges?
The contest in the appeal court, as at first instance, was over whether the release,
as a contract, was unconscionable and so unenforceable. More precisely, since unconscionability is a defence that, like fraud or duress, allows the victim to proceed as if
there never was a contract - rescind the contract ab initio, as Latin-loving lawyers love
to say - the court's job was to decide whether Smyth could revoke the deal three days
later. Despite occasional loose language saying it is the court that rescinds for unconscionability, rescinding is what the victim does. The court merely declares the rescission valid or not and, ifvalid, gives it consequential effect unless the remedy is otherwise
barred.' No-one suggested any bar: Smyth's letter was timely and clear enough in complaining of duress and lack of volition for her to use it to ground an unconscionability
defence.
(b) The test(s): two speed-bumps or one?
In 1978 in Harry v. Kreutziger,' Lambert J.A. proffered a unitary test for unconscionability: "whether the transaction, seen as a whole, is sufficiently divergent from community standards of commercial morality that it should be rescinded". This test is not
universally admired. In Smyth v. Szep, Gibbs J.A., for one, was unimpressed. It might
work, he said, "if there is evidence of what the community is and what the generally
acceptable standard of morality is in that community" but judges had to avoid introducing
their "subjective view of the morality of the case."'
Gibbs J.A. preferred the older test stated by Davey J.A in Morrison v. Coast Finance
Ltd:
Proof of inequality in the position of the parties arising out of the ignorance,
need or distress of the weaker, which left him in the power of the stronger,
and proof of substantial unfairness of the bargain obtained by the stronger.
On proof of those circumstances, it [sic] creates a presumption of fraud which
the stronger must repel by proving the bargain was fair, just and reasonable. . .,
For this test to retain or gain adherents, its ponderous and foreboding language should
surely be modernized. Davey J.A. himself could not have intended his words to be a
carved-in-stone statutory definition and, even if he had, judges have warned one another
often enough not to parse their words like statutes. So, for example, "fair, just and
reasonable", a soothing and rhythmic phrase, no doubt carries the magic lawyers traditionally associate with groups of three; but the words are synonyms and nothing is gained
by seeking to find some fine distinction between them. On the other hand, "ignorance,
need or distress" are different but not exhaustive: Davey himself had earlier stated the
principle more broadly ("an unconscientious use of power by a stronger party against
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a weaker") and surely did not mean the abuse could be foiled by proof the weaker
party was not "ignorant, needy or distressed" according to Webster's.
(c) Cleansing the palate of fraud
It isalso time judges stopped saying that unconscionable behaviour, while certainly
undesirable, raises a "presumption of fraud". "Fraud", the mid-Victorian chancery court's
passe-partout to jurisdiction, was not being then used in the sense of "crookedness":
rather, it meant just that someone was behaving "unconscientiously" or "unfairly"."o But
"fraud" more commonly meant and still means "dishonesty", and courts with plenary
law and equity powers like the Supreme Court of British Columbia need not use it
to found jurisdiction.
Whatever Settler was in Smyth v. Szep, he was not a crook; and it is a pitiful plea
in mitigation for a judge using an offensive word like "fraud" against someone to say,
like some scornful Humpty Dumpty, that "when I use aword, it means just what I choose
it to mean - neither more nor less."

(d) Rampant amorality
Even if the language ismodernized, it isimpossible to rid unconscionability of moral
content, as Gibbs J.A. apparently would have it." He liked the Davey test apparently
because it prevents judges from applying their "subjective morality of the case". But
Gibbs J.A. is deluding himself if he believes that. Are phrases like "ignorance, need
or distress of the weaker", "power of the stronger", "substantial unfairness", and "fair,
just and reasonable" measurable on a slide rule?" They may circumscribe or camouflage
the application of a judge's moral views but they don't invite those views to be suppressed nor give any standard by which a judge could do so.
Nor is the idea that a court should first be given evidence of a "community standard
of morality" before it can apply any moral standards helpful. Equity may abhor a vacuum, but it surely neither is nor operates as one. Is unconscionability to become contract's equivalent of obscenity? Is each side going to call an expert - whom? a humanist?
moral philosopher? cleric? of which religion? - to qualify and testify on the appropriate moral standard to be applied? Assume the experts disagree (not unusual, even for
philosophers or clerics): how will the court choose between them? By applying some
morally-neutral test - like burden of proof (itself the reflection of a moral principle)?
Taylor J.A. for the majority in Smyth v. Szep did not seek to avoid the moral issue
and was keen to update Morrison's archaic language, although he obviously thought
there was little in substance between the Davey and Lambert tests. The principle Taylor
formulated to try and bridge both Davey's equitable theory and Lambert's "community
morality" theory was that
a settlement such as the present may be set aside as unconscionable where
it is shown that the parties were not on an equal footing - which will necessarily be so where a young person such as the present plaintiff, without relevant advice, knowledge or experience, settles a personal injury claim with an
experienced Insurance Corporation adjuster - and where the settlement is
made at the instigation of the adjuster for a sum which cannot be said to be
'fair' on the basis of what was then known to the adjuster, or within the adjuster's
means of knowledge, unless there are special circumstances justifying the transaction."
What is interesting about a principle like this is how most can agree on its statement
but disagree on its application. So in Smyth v. Szep, with only transcripts and affidavits
to go on, the majority and minority judges were able to say, with equal self-conviction,
that Smyth had no "relevant advice, knowledge or experience" (Taylor J.A.), or she
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had failed to prove that she was dominated, ignorant, poor, in pain or that she didn't
know what she was doing when she signed the release (Gibbs J.A.). Similarly, from
the same material, a fair settlement in September 1987, had Settler bothered to find
out Smyth's condition, "would clearly have to be an amount several times the settlement offered" (Taylor J.A.).14 Or the settlement was not out of line on the facts known
to Settler: it wasn't Settler's job to cross-examine Smyth on her state; it was up to Smyth
herself, apparently fully in charge of her faculties, to have told Settler about it (Gibbs J.A.).
Unconscionability is like that. Where you get to depends upon where you start and
what baggage you start off with. There's no dialogue among the starters once they're
off: their paths quickly diverge and their voices become first dim, then inaudible to one
another. And when one reads the final product of their mental voyage, one is hard
pressed to believe that they all started off from the same point with common starting
material.
(e) When: then or now?
All the judges in Smyth v. Szep said unconscionability should be judged only in the
light of what was known at the time of contracting.
Assume Smyth had not had her pains but had some latent injury that revealed itself
only after she had signed the release; assume further that what she lacked in commercial sophistication she made up by hiring a lawyer to represent her in settling. It seems
plain she could not have rescinded, for unconscionability, any release signed by her
on her lawyer's advice, however serious the injuries that appeared later might be.
This follows from a 1983 decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Cougle
v. Maricevic," which all in Smyth v. Szep accepted as good law. In Cougle, three days

after his motor vehicle accident, the victim turned up, barely suo motu, friend in tow,
at the ICBC claims centre wanting to settle his claim. The adjuster, who had the other
driver's accident report in front of him, did not question liability. Instead, after checking
with the hospital dnd deciding the victim would recover in 6 weeks, he offered the victim $1,500. The victim accepted, signed a releasc, and went back home to New Brunswick. His injuries took longer to clear up, so he claimed for extra pain and suffering
and lost income. Both Paris J. and the Court of Appeal refused to set aside the release.
The appeal court thought the plaintiff had shown he was no match for the insurer, but
he had not shown the bargain was unfair: "all must be decided on the basis of the circumstances as they existed, and were known, at the time the transaction was entered
into", said Lambert J.A.16
Before a court like this, a victim would be no better off trying other defences such
as mistake: judqes who think a bargain is fair must also think that someone trying to
avoid it is behaving unfairly. They are hardly likely to reach for other reasons to help
him out. The doctor and lawyer who misjudged the plaintiff's medical and legal condition might perhaps be sued for incompetence, but those are not easy actions.
(f) Niceness is the best policy
There isanother striking passage in Taylor J.A.'s judgment in Smyth v. Szep, where
he said people ought to expect better things of ICBC than they might of a private insurer:
The community should in my view be taken to expect adherence to a high
standard of commercial morality of a Crown corporation exercising a monopoly function of this sort in settling claims with members of the public which
it serves."

Taylor J.A. at least looked at the conduct of the right party, the insurance corporation, rather than simply its employee, the adjuster. This has not always happened in
the past. Indeed, in Cougle v. Maricevic and even Smyth v. Szep itself, the judges tended
to talk more about the conduct of the adjuster than about that of his employer in
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deciding whether the parties were unequal, commercially moral, or produced a fair
bargain. But the plaintiff's complaint is not against either the adjuster or the nominal
defendant (the careless driver): it is against the corporation. It is the insurer's conduct
and relationship with the plaintiff that is relevant. A bargain, fair from the adjuster's
perspective, may not be so when viewed as the bargain of the insurer. The puppeteer
has to be responsible for her marionettes.
Taylor J.A.'s sentiment goes beyond this but exactly where and how far is unclear.
Is he saying:
(i) that ICBC owes a duty to claimants to be super-nice because it is a monopoly
and an agent of the state and dealing with ordinary lay people?
(ii) that the standard of super-niceness applies to all entities that satisfy only one
or more of the conditions in (i)?
(iii) that ICBC is hoist by its own boasted "philosophy and approach to adjusting",
allegedly distinct from the approach of private insurers that settle claims only "on
the best possible basis for the benefit of the company":
"We think we have two duties: a duty to the public at large to administer the funds
which are entrusted to us in a responsible, careful manner and a duty to the individual who is making a claim to act in a fair and reasonable manner towards
him, giving him every doubt we can, subject to the proper administration of the
funds"?T', or
(iv) some or all of the above?
Whatever the intention, as a statement of principle Taylor J.A.'s remarks lead nowhere. Are we really to infer that private insurers may instruct their adjusters to observe
a lower standard of commercial morality than public sector insurers? On this theory,
what, in practice, are judges going to let private insurers get away with?
Moreover, Taylor J.A.'s remarks do not square with Cougle v. Maricevic," which he
claimed to be applying. In Cougle, the court explicitly rejected suggestions made earlier
by Anderson and Toy JJ. as trial judges"o that an insurance adjuster must treat an unrepresented claimant as if he were a solicitor advising his own client. This is no outrageous suggestion: a similar holding by a British judge that an insurer was a fiduciary
towards an injured victim and could not rely on a release when it undercompensated
him" has been approved by a leading text on insurance law." But the British Columbia
court, like other Canadian courts, would have none of this. Instead, said Hinkson J.A.
in Cougle, the general principles of unconscionability apply to "any member of society
in dealing with another member of society,"" and Lambert J.A., the proponent of the
"commercial morality" test of unconscionability, expressly agreed."
The Cougle court knew it was dealing with an ICBC adjuster and that the earlier
cases before Anderson and Toy JJ. involved adjusters working for private insurers; yet
Cougle explicitly imposed the same standard of behaviour on public and private insurers and adjusters alike. On this point, Cougle is right in principle, if only because
it seems both impossible and purposeless to formulate and apply different standards
to these cases. Whether that standard should be that of a fiduciary or something lower
is however a question of substantive legal policy, and in British Columbia "something
lower" has plainly become the rule.
(g) How does it play in Peoria?
Unconscionability doesn't have to be like this. It can operate differently, some think
better. It does sometimes operate differently in the United States, not in some way-out
state (typically California) that Canadians love to caricature (there but for the grace of
B.C. courts go we), but in heartland U.S.A., Peoria no less.
In Newborn v. Hood," six months after her car accident in 1977, the victim released
her negj ence claim against the driver and his insurer for $1,200. The plaintiff was
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legally represented and the lawyer offered to settle for $1,200, based on a report he
sent to the adjuster from the hospital doctor who thought the plaintiff's injuries were
minor and over. Exactly a year after the accident, the plaintiff had a delayed heart attack caused by her accident. Her medical bills were over $8,000 and she lost wages
of over $7,000. In 1979 the Circuit Court of Peoria held the release invalid and allowed the plaintiff to pursue her negligence claim. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed
the following year.
When judged against the 20-odd pages Smyth v. Szep occupies in the law reports,
the opinion is remarkable for its apparent unremarkability. It covers just three pages
in the law reports and treats the case matter-of-factly, almost routinely. There were only
two issues for decision:
(1) May a court consider facts, unknown at the time the parties execute a release
of all claims, in determining whether or not the release isunconscionable and based
upon a mutual mistake of fact; and (2) Was there a mutual mistake of fact under
the circumstances of this cause as to the nature and extent of the injuries incurred
by the plaintiff such that the release should be set aside as unconscionable[?]26
The court compared the injuries first suspected with those later discovered and the
money received with the economic loss suffered, and quickly concluded in the plaintiff's favour.
The most noteworthy thing about this judgment, especially if one reads it immediately after having read Smyth v. Szep, is what the Illinois court chose not to say. It
didn't get sententious or censorious about anyone. The plaintiff's lawyer was not called
a fool; the doctor was not called an incompetent for his wrong diagnosis and prognosis; the plaintiff's mentality, life and finances were not judicially investigated to see whether
or to what degree she was "ignorant, needy or distressed"; the insurance adjuster's experience, life history or good faith was not called into question, nor did the court say
he had tried to take advantage of the plaintiff or her lawyer; a private insurance company was involved but the judges didn't ask it or themselves what standard of commercial morality it should be held to; and the fact that the release was fair on the facts
known when it was signed was taken for granted.
I don't know whether Illinois courts would today take this tack, but I confess I find
the Illinois decision not one whit the worse because it was low-keyed or because it did
not investigate, indeed hardly mentioned, the matters that seemed to preoccupy the
judges sitting in British Columbia. If unconscionability always operated like this, some
of its Canadian critics might even be persuaded to treat it seriously. The trouble is, it
doesn't.
4. Yesterday's unconscionability, today's conscionability, tomorrow's ... ?
Victims in decades past have tried to use all sorts of ways to avoid insurance releases
signed before the full extent of their injury became evident: duress, mistake, fraud, innocent misrepresentation, infancy, interpretation (contra proferentem and its Latin ilk),
even non est factum (a species of mistake more appropriate to invalidate transactions
against strangers)." After the dust of litigation and commentary settles, nobody can
predict anywhere when a court will feel inclined to come to the aid of the victim.
Unconscionability, today's defence a la mode, may make some hope that the tendency for Canadian courts to mutter, like deranged versions of Gertrude Stein, that
"a release is a release is a release", may be reversed, but the hope is unfounded. Unconscionability elsewhere is utterly unpredictable;" why should it suddenly become so
in release cases? Not every American court reasons like Newborn v. Hood." The prevailing mood among judges of one decade and place may favour victims, of another, insurers: judicial policy in Illinois in 1992 may differ from that prevailing in the 1980s.
Take, for example, Washington. There, in 1974, the state Supreme Court unanimously
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allowed a plaintiff to claim for personal injuries appearing three months after a motor
vehicle accident, even though the victim signed a general release and was compensated for his vehicle damage a month after the accident. The court said it was following
the majority U.S. rule, which was to evaluate releases by the following criteria:
(1)The peculiar dignity and protection to [sic] which the law cloaks the human
person, as contrasted with articles of commerce;
(2) The inequality of the bargaining positions and relative intelligence of the
contracting parties;
(3) The amount of consideration received;
(4) The likelihood of inadequate knowledge concerning future consequences
of present injury to the human body and brain;
(5) The haste, or lack thereof, with which release was obtained."
This preserved some flexibility, but the court's inclination was pretty plain: a general
release signed by a victim soon after an accident when he or she might not know the
extent or even presence of personal injuries would not hold up if serious injuries later
appeared. By 1987, thirteen years later, the times had a-changed. The grand rhetoric
of the 1970s about the "peculiar dignity of the human person" had given way to neoconservative economics, to "crises" in the courts and amongst liability insurers, and
to mounting public pressure to keep auto insurance premiums down. A differently composed Supreme Court kissed stare decisis goodbye: the 1974 case was "limited to its
facts", i.e., "to situations where there is no known injury at the time the release is executed". A victim who signs a release knowing he or she has some personal injury,
"knowingly takes a gamble" and the policy of promoting the finality of private settlements becomes trumps. 3'
5. Common law (f)utility
Nobody - except a lawyer or a judge - can really believe that judges, using their
common law or equitable powers, can effectively regulate the validity of releases. Nor
is it realistic to expect insurers voluntarily to do so. Whatever messages the courts have
sent out for the last century through their judgments have left the insurance industry
with enough manoeuvering room to keep firm to its policy of "release now, tough it
out later" 3 ' Does anyone really expect ICBC or any other insurer to act any differently
after Smyth v. Szep, even had the court been unanimous? There is always another
time, another court, another set of facts just a little different from the last. Marvin Baer
can write that
in the absence of any dispute, there is no good reason why an insurer should
enjoy the protection of a release given by an insured (or by an injured victim
in the case of liability insurance) who has not yet appreciated the full extent
of his loss"
but pleas like this are never heard in insurance boardrooms and are given effect to all
too rarely in courtrooms.
Unconscionability doctrine, perversely, has its uses here, but only because it reveals
in stark relief how badly the legal process deals with a simple issue. Without being diverted
by the fact that Smyth v. Szep reached the right result, albeit by a one-vote whisker,
let's look at the process leading to this result and its implications.
Let's start with the fact that we have an accident victim who legally merits compensation and, for whatever reason, has signed a release to get some money now rather
than feeling she's going to have to wait for Godot. Added to her physical trauma, the
accident victim now has the added psychological trauma of having to hire a lawyer
to go to court for her and prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his client was a
fool. And having proved that before one court, the lawyer has to repeat the performance before three judges because our legal system indicates that just because one
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judge finds you a fool, that isn't enough. The victim might be only an ersatz fool, smart
enough to gull a single judge into falling for her crypto-folly; so we must have three
presumptively smarter judges there to make sure that, yep, she's a bona fide, chromiumplated, patented fool all right - and the legal system won't be messed up if we let
her off the hook for signing the release.
The evidence of an expert in psychology is no doubt admissible on the point but
fortunately this expense is generally foregone for lawyers seem to think they need no
help in most cases figuring out how stupid a person is. This can be done even without
seeing the people involved. All one need do is to read a transcript of what the person
says and couple that with the precedents on unconscionability. These span many countries and decades. Indeed in Smyth v. Szep itself, it was thought important to refer
to a case 109 years old from England14 for lawyers and judges to check out whether
the stupidity there matched the stupidity here, and then to tut-tut about how silly some
people really have been over the ages in dealing with others. Then the big question:
pound for mental pound, was this plaintiff as silly as the plaintiff in 1873 or some other
plaintiff who got his contract set aside, or were her synapses better ordered? Should
a higher or lower standard of intelligence be expected now, as compared with then?
Was the deal she got into quite as bad as the deal that or some other long-dead plaintiff
struck, or did she do better? Was the adjuster and/or the insurer as nice as defendants
past, or did either of them fall below that line that marks honest conduct from
"presumptive fraud"?
Throughout all this, it is useful to remember that we have here an injured victim and
an insurer who, by law, is responsible for compensating her in money for her injuries;
that the insurer istrying to evade that responsibility because it has set in motion a chain
of events, the likely result of which it knows full well; and that, as long as courts send
out blurry messages like that in Smyth v. Szep, insurers will encourage their adjusters
to behave as Settler did because it pays them to do so. The occasional persistent victim
like Martina Smyth who realizes she's been shortchanged will remain outnumbered by
those who won't challenge the release because they are made to feel like cheats for
trying to renege on their signature, or simply because there is not enough money involved for a lawyer to take on their claim.
Think of the easy rule that should govern this case: where liability is not genuinely
in issue, the release of a personal injuries claim should never bind the victim until the
claim itself is barred by a limitation statute. Courts could establish a flat rule like this
by saying that such releases are void as against public policy. The majority in Smyth
v. Szep went that far, almost; but, in law, "almost" is a long step away from "always".
6. An appealing note: or swimming to Victoria
It would be easy to applaud Smyth v. Szep as a wholesome case indicating keen
judicial sensitivities on the part of the majority judges and reaffirming the continued
vitality of unconscionability doctrine. To do so would, I think, be misguided. Twentyfive years ago, the late Arthur Leff saw what was wrong with over-relying on unconscionability:
... [Unconscionability] tends to permit to make the true bases of decisions more
hidden to those trying to use them as the basis of future planning. But more
important, it tends to permit a court to be nondisclosive about the basis of its
decision even to itself. . . . [Wihen you forbid a contractual practice, you ought
to have the political nerve to do so with some understanding (and some disclosure) of what you are doing.

. . .

Subsuming problems is not as good as

solving them, and may in fact retard solutions instead."
The enforceability of insurance releases has remained unclear everywhere despite
decades of litigation. If the judicial handling of the problem demonstrates anything, it
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is that judicial handling hasn't worked. All one has is a plethora of doctrine, with unconscionability superadded to create further confusion and expense.
The legal profession often likes the intellectual challenge of complicated laws, complicated laws also mean more legal and judicial business, and at the end of the day
everyone feels they have done somebody some good. But it behoves lawyers and judges
of good conscience to seek to improve a system as inefficient and costly as that which
has grown around the problem of insurance releases. Lawyers could draw the attention
of legislators to the problem. They could try to convince courts to move away from
unconscionability towards outright bans on public policy grounds. Judges could show
themselves willing either to be persuaded or to support calls for remedial legislation.
For those members of the general public who are accident victims do not benefit from
the present situation; only insurers do. So long as the law remains as unstable as it
is,insurers will continue to have greater leverage in settling and resisting the reopening
of settlements. This will mean the systematic undercompensation of accident victims.
Is this what the citizens of British Columbia want?
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